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Abstract
Unexpected risk events in drinking water systems, such as heavy rain or manure spill accidents, can cause waterborne out-
breaks of gastrointestinal disease. Using a scenario-based approach, these unexpected risk events were included in a risk-
based decision model aimed at evaluating risk reduction alternatives. The decision model combined quantitative microbial 
risk assessment and cost–benefit analysis and investigated four risk reduction alternatives. Two drinking water systems 
were compared using the same set of risk reduction alternatives to illustrate the effect of unexpected risk events. The first 
drinking water system had a high pathogen base load and a high pathogen  log10 reduction in the treatment plant, whereas 
the second drinking water system had a low pathogen base load and a low pathogen  Log10 reduction in the treatment plant. 
Four risk reduction alternatives were evaluated on their social profitability: (A1) installation of pumps and back-up power 
supply, to remove combined sewer overflows; (A2) installation of UV treatment in the drinking water treatment plant; (A3) 
connection of 25% of the OWTSs in the catchment area to the WWTP; and (A4) a combination of A1–A3. Including the 
unexpected risk events changed the probability of a positive net present value for the analysed alternatives in the decision 
model and the alternative that is likely to have the highest net present value. The magnitude of the effect of unexpected risk 
events is dependent on the local preconditions in the drinking water system. For the first drinking water system, the unex-
pected risk events increase risk to a lesser extent compared to the second drinking water system. The main conclusion was 
that it is important to include unexpected risk events in decision models for evaluating microbial risk reduction, especially 
in a drinking water system with a low base load and a low pathogen  log10 reduction in the drinking water treatment plant.
Keywords Decision support · Quantitative microbial risk assessment (QMRA) · Cost–benefit analysis (CBA) · Dose–
response · Risk management · Water quality modelling
Introduction
Contaminated drinking water can cause waterborne infec-
tions (Guzman-Herrador et al. 2015) and result in a con-
siderable cost to society due to health effects and related 
monetary effects (Lindberg et al. 2011). Microbial risks in 
drinking water systems are mainly related to gastrointestinal 
disease resulting from infection by various pathogens (e.g. 
Campylobacter, Salmonella, EHEC, norovirus, rotavirus, 
Cryptosporidium and Giardia) (WHO 2016). Microbial 
risks in drinking water systems can be divided into two main 
components (Assmuth et al. 2016). Firstly, a base microbial 
risk level caused by pathogen sources with a predictable 
contribution and a continuous or reoccurring temporal dis-
tribution (wastewater discharge, annual manure spreading, 
etc.). Secondly, microbial risks related to unexpected risk 
events occurring with an uneven, less predictable temporal 
distribution and with typically short and varying durations 
(spill accidents with faecal matter containing pathogens, 
extreme weather events, combined sewer overflows, techni-
cal system failures, etc.).
To describe the total risk, a set of events must be identi-
fied to describe possible scenarios that may occur and cause 
problems. In Fig. 1, the base load  (UR0) represents the base 
risk level that occurs on an annual basis.  UR1,  UR2…URn 
represent unexpected risk events occurring irregularly and 
occasionally. These unexpected risk events are part of the 
total risk in a drinking water system. In drinking water 
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distribution systems, unexpected risk events have been 
investigated to a certain extent (e.g. Viñas et al. 2018), but 
there has been less focus on the drinking water catchments 
and the adoption of a holistic approach, which would include 
all parts of a drinking water system. The use of a risk graph 
to illustrate the total risk has been described, including 
examples such as nuclear power and dam failures (Ale et al. 
2015), but not in this type of drinking water setting. In the 
risk graph in Fig. 1, the area under the curve illustrates the 
total risk. Risk reduction alternatives aim to reduce the total 
risk, i.e. the graph area, either by reducing the base load, 
reducing the unexpected risk events, or reducing both. The 
graph shape varies and is dependent on the types of unex-
pected risks in the system.
The total microbial risk level in drinking water systems 
is thus affected by unexpected risk events. Despite this, 
drinking water producers in Sweden commonly perform 
risk analysis based solely on the average base load  (UR0) 
or adapt a worst-case scenario with the highest risk  (URn) 
to serve as a dimensioning event. In the first case, the risk 
level may be underestimated, while in the second case the 
risk level may be overestimated. To supply safe water to 
drinking water consumers, microbial risks in drinking water 
systems need to be managed and, depending on the system, 
risk reduction measures may need to be implemented. How-
ever, implementing these measures is costly and available 
resources must be used efficiently. It may thus be of great 
importance to consider unexpected risk events to provide 
holistic decision support.
Earlier studies have set up models for evaluating the 
microbial risks in drinking water systems (e.g. Bartram et al. 
2009; Bergion et al. 2017; Schijven et al. 2011, 2013, 2015) 
and related economic effects (e.g. Baffoe-Bonnie et al. 2008; 
Bergion et al. 2018b; Juntunen et al. 2017). In general, it 
can be concluded that unexpected risk events have a short 
duration, hence the importance of analysing the risk using 
an appropriate time resolution. In addition, unexpected risk 
events related to climate change are likely to increase in 
the future, highlighting the importance of accounting for 
future changes in risk and decision models (Schijven et al. 
2013). Accounting for both the base risk and unexpected 
risk events has been identified as important for integrated 
water management on a qualitative level (Assmuth et al. 
2016), although to our knowledge there is no detailed quan-
titative description available of how to perform this. On the 
other hand, looking only at the risk assessment and omit-
ting any decision analysis, Westrell et al. (2003) reported 
that the microbial base risk caused the majority of annual 
infections. Risk management will be dependent on thorough 
identification of relevant events to be included. Furthermore, 
this inclusion of unexpected risk events facilitates analyses 
aimed at investigating whether dimensioning risks are part 
of the base load or part of the unexpected risk events.
The main contribution and novelty of this study was to 
enable inclusion of unexpected risk events in the decision 
analysis for prioritising microbial risk reduction in drinking 
water systems using a scenario-based approach. An existing 
risk-based decision model was used as a starting point for 
this work (Bergion et al. 2018b). To achieve the aim, further 
features were added to the decision model:
 − The risk was calculated on a daily basis, to take account 
of variation in the daily risk level and the occurrence of 
unexpected risk events.
 − Hydrological modelling was added to the already 
applied hydrodynamic model to simulate the fate and 
transport of pathogens in the catchment.
 − Unexpected risk events were included using a scenario-
based approach.
To illustrate the expanded decision model, it was applied 
to two drinking water systems with distinctly different char-
acteristics. The comparison facilitated the investigation of 
unexpected risk events and their impact on drinking water 
systems with different preconditions.
Methods
The risk-based decision model (Bergion et al. 2018b) is 
based on quantitative microbial risk assessment (QMRA), 
including source characterisation, hydrological model-
ling, hydrodynamic modelling, groundwater modelling and 
dose–response models. Hydrological modelling describes 
the processes within the catchment and contribution from 
land sources to the lake, hydrodynamic modelling estimates 
Fig. 1  Example of a risk graph illustrating the total risk from regu-
larly occurring risk events and unexpected risk events occurring 
irregularly and occasionally
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the pathogen fate and transport within the lake, and ground-
water modelling estimates the pathogen removal in the 
artificial groundwater recharge. The hydrodynamic model-
ling and the groundwater modelling were used to estimate 
the  log10 pathogen removal in the lake and in the artificial 
groundwater recharge, respectively. The decision model is 
also based on cost–benefit analysis (CBA) to enable evalua-
tion of risk reduction alternatives in order to determine the 
alternative that is most profitable for society. In this study, 
risks were calculated using an updated version of the deci-
sion model (Bergion et al. 2018b) and the risk was expressed 
in terms of probability of infection, lost quality-adjusted 
life years (QALYs) and the number of infections. The risk 
cost was calculated using a unit value per lost QALY and a 
unit value per infection. Details on the decision model and 
related assumptions can be found in (Bergion et al. 2018b) 
and in the supplementary material, Table S1. A schematic 
illustration of the decision model is presented in Fig. 2.
Two drinking water systems were investigated. For the 
first system, settings for the Vomb drinking water system 
(Vomb DWS) were used, as described in Bergion et al. 
(2018b). The second system (Alt. DWS) was based on the 
Vomb DWS, although the artificial groundwater recharge 
was replaced by a treatment step resulting in much lower 
pathogen removal. Additionally, the Alternative Lake Vomb 
was assumed to provide less pathogen removal compared 
to Lake Vomb. It was also assumed that the base load for 
the alternative system was 1% of the base load of the Vomb 
DWS. The Alt. DWS was set up to be representative for 
many drinking water systems in Sweden in terms of the 
treatment steps and the resulting  log10 removal of pathogens.
Microbial risks included in the base load  (UR0) were 
wastewater discharges and combined sewer overflows 
(CSOs) from on-site wastewater treatment systems (OWTS) 
and wastewater treatment plants (WWTP), manure applica-
tion on farmland and grazing farm animals. The OWTSs 
and WWTPs were added as point sources to the tributary 
discharges into the lake. The manure application and grazing 
farm animals were added using the SWAT (Soil and Water 
Assessment Tool) hydrological model set up for the catch-
ment. Note that the wild animals were not accounted for 
in the model. Also included were unexpected risks from a 
precipitation event with a 10-year return period  (UR1), emer-
gency CSOs (ECSO)  (UR2) and an accident resulting in a 
large manure discharge directly into the lake  (UR3).
The decision model was illustrated by investigating four 
risk reduction alternatives: (A1) installation of pumps and 
a back-up power supply to remove CSOs and ECSOs; (A2) 
installation of UV treatment in the drinking water treatment 
plant (DWTP); (A3) connection of 25% of the OWTSs in 
the catchment to the WWTP; and (A4) a combination of 
A1–A3. The risk reduction alternatives were compared to a 
reference alternative (A0), where no risk reduction measures 
were implemented.
By defining uncertainty distributions for the input data, 
Monte Carlo simulations (@risk version 7.6.0) could be used 
to also present uncertainties in the results. The risk model, 
including the added model features, is presented below.
Quantitative Microbial Risk Assessment
Source Characterisation
The daily average pathogen (p) concentration in OWTSs 
(cOWTS,i,p) (#/L) contributing to the pathogen count in trib-
utary i was calculated as in Bergion et al. (2018b) using 
epidemiological statistics. Details can be found in the sup-
plementary material.
Fig. 2  Schematic illustration of the decision model and how different methods are connected
 V. Bergion et al.
1 3
The contribution of WWTP discharge (cWWTP,i,p) (#/L) to 
the pathogen concentration in tributary i was calculated as:
where cww,p (#/L) was the literature value of pathogen (p) 
concentration in wastewater, RWWTP,p  (log10 removal) was 
the pathogen removal in the WWTP reported in the literature 
(Supplementary Table S1), Qi was the average daily flow 
in tributary i, and QWWTP (L/Day) was the average daily 
wastewater production. The cww,p was approximated to a log 
normal distribution with µ/σ LN(17200/13200) for Campy-
lobacter (Stampi et al. 1993) and LN(3947233/190.7) for 
norovirus, respectively. For Cryptosporidium, the cww,p was 
set at a point value of  103.4, estimated by the authors based 
on observed oocyst concentrations during the Östersund 
waterborne outbreak in 2010 (PHAS 2011).
Based on Ottoson et al. (2006), the pathogen removal in 
WWTP was included using uniform distribution with min/
max of 2/3, 0.5/1.5 and 0.5/2.5 for Campylobacter, norovirus 
and Cryptosporidium, respectively.
The contribution by CSOs (cCSO,i,p) (#/L) to the tributary 
pathogen concentration was estimated using the same litera-
ture values as for WWTP discharge, though it was assumed 
the CSOs would not undergo any treatment:
where QCSO (L/Day) was the volume of wastewater dis-
charged from the CSO. Based on CSO frequencies and vol-
umes for the last five years, it was assumed that one CSO 
with a volume of 139,500 L occurred each year. The timing 
of the CSO was assumed to be during the summer months, 
coinciding with the grazing period but not with manure 
application. This was assumed since standard practice is to 
avoid manure application in temporal proximity to heavy 
rain due to the loss of nutrients and the fact that the ground 
cannot cope with heavy vehicles.
Hydrological Modelling
The contribution of grazing activities and manure applica-
tion (note that only Cryptosporidium was considered for 
these two pathogen sources) to the pathogen concentrations 
in the tributaries was estimated using the Soil and Water 
Assessment Tool (SWAT) (Nietsch et al. 2011), which was 
set up for the Vomb catchment. The model included trans-
port from land sources to water and die-off processes dur-
ing land transport and in the watercourse. The number of 
farm animals, dairy cows (5279), calves (6967), heifers and 
steers 1–2 years (7416) and heifers > 2 years (3257), was 
(1)cWWTS,i,p =
cWW,p ⋅ 10
−RWWTP,p
⋅ QWWTP
Qi + QWWTP
(2)cCSO,i,p =
cWW,p ⋅ QCSO
Qi + QCSO
based on reported statistics for the municipality of Sjöbo for 
2016 (Swedish Board of Agriculture 2019). The amount of 
manure produced during indoor periods, and later applied 
to farmland during manure application, was calculated in 
the manner presented in (Bergion et al. 2017). 1591, 308, 
411 and 411 kg manure per hectare was applied to fields 
on 15 April, June, August and October each year, where 
proportions were based on (Statistics Sweden 2012). It was 
assumed that the grazing animals (excluding calves) grazed 
for 153 days, starting on 1 May and the daily contribution 
from grazing was 88 kg per hectare. Based on literature 
values for herd prevalence and excretion, the number of 
Cryptosporidium oocysts in manure was estimated to 4400 
(oocysts/g) (Sokolova et al. 2018, Table S2).
The SWAT model was calibrated and validated based 
on the observed monthly average flow for the Eggelstad 
gauging station (SMHI 2018). Calibration was performed 
for 2009–2013, and validation for 2014–2017. The Nash 
Sutcliffe Efficiency (NSE) index was used to determine the 
fit between simulated and observed water flow. The SWAT-
CUP software was used, applying the General Likelihood 
Uncertainty Estimation (GLUE) approach, simulating 1000 
iterations (Abbaspour 2013). Calibration and validation of 
the water flow resulted in an NSE index of 0.75 and 0.78, 
respectively. These are considered to be very good results, 
since the NSE index can range from − ∞ to + 1, where 
a value above 0.5 is considered good, and a value above 
0.75 is considered very good (Moriasi et al. 2007). Final 
parameter values are presented in supplementary material, 
Table S3. Calibration and validation of the pathogen concen-
trations were not possible as no observations were available.
SWAT model results for the grazing months May–Sep-
tember during the simulation period 2009–2017 were used 
as input for the risk-based decision model. Daily Crypto-
sporidium oocyst concentrations were randomly resampled 
from the SWAT model output to represent the variations in 
Cryptosporidium oocyst concentrations due to the variations 
in hydrometeorological conditions during this period.
The daily maximum Cryptosporidium oocyst concentra-
tions in the tributaries (cManu,i,p) (#/L) from April to October 
simulated in the SWAT model were used as input for manure 
application. These maximum concentrations were assumed 
to last for one week after the manure application day. No sto-
chastic input for manure application was used in the Monte 
Carlo simulations.
The total pathogen (p) concentrations (cTOT,i,p,S) in the 
tributaries (i) for each scenario (S) were calculated as:
where S corresponded to the different scenarios, i.e. pos-
sible combinations of considered events (presented fur-
ther in Fig. 3. below), and cUR was the contribution from 
(3)
cTOT,i,p,S = cOWTS,i,p + cWWTP,i,p + cCSO,i,p + cGraz,i,p + cManu,i,p + cUR
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unexpected risk events as explained in the section Scenario-
based approach for including unexpected risk events below.
Pathogen Removal Based on Hydrodynamic 
and Groundwater Modelling
The daily drinking water pathogen concentration (cDW,p,S) 
was calculated as:
where RLAKE was the  log10 removal during transport in Lake 
Vomb from the tributary mouth to the raw water intake for 
Borstbäcken (Bo), Torpsbäcken (To) and Björkaån (Bj), 
respectively, RDWTP was the  log10 removal in the DWTP 
plant. The RLAKE was based on Bergion et al. (2018b). The 
removal in the DWTP was calculated as:
where RStepI, RStepII and RStepIII were the combinations of 
treatment steps in the specific risk reduction alternative. The 
 log10 removal in the treatment steps was estimated using 
values reported in the literature (see Table 1). For norovi-
rus, the  log10 removal in the artificial groundwater recharge 
(AGR) was estimated using a groundwater virus transport 
model (including retention time, attachment of pathogens 
to soil and pathogen die-off) (Åström et al. 2016). The pos-
sible combinations of treatment steps and their removal are 
reported in Table 1.
Dose–Response Model
The dose–response models used were the same as in Bergion 
et al. (2018b). The daily probability of infection per per-
son (Pinf,p,S) (no unit) was calculated using a dose–response 
(4)cDW,p,S =
(
cTOT,Bo,p,S ⋅ 10
−RLAKE,Bo,p + cTOT,To,p,S ⋅ 10
−RLAKE,To,p + cTOT,Bj,p,S ⋅ 10
−RLAKE,Bj,p
)
⋅ 10−(RDWTP)
(5)RDWTP = RStepI + RStepII + RStepIII
model, adapting the Exact Beta Poisson distribution, repre-
sented using an exponential function with a beta distribution 
in the exponent:
where S was the scenario (refers to the different scenarios 
in Fig. 3 below) for that specific day, hp (no unit) was the 
(6)Pinf,p,S = e−hp⋅Dp,S
Fig. 3  Schematic illustration of the variation in base pathogen load 
(solid areas) and the possible positions of unexpected risk events 
(striped areas). Note that the height of the bars is not to scale. O + W 
(OWTS and WWTP, included in all scenarios), M (manure), G (graz-
ing), G + M (grazing and manure), and G + CSO (grazing and CSO) 
represent the five different scenarios of when unexpected risk events 
could occur in relation to the five different base load levels. Note that 
the possible positions O + W, M, G, G + M and G + CSO are only 
examples, and that the actual event can take place on any day when 
the same base load conditions for each scenario exist
infectivity (represented using a beta distribution with α and 
β for each pathogen), Dp, was the pathogen dose for the 
scenario (S). Values for α/β were 0.024/0.011 (Teunis et al. 
2005), 0.04/0.055 (Teunis et al. 2008) and 0.115/0.176 (Teu-
nis et al. 2002) for Campylobacter, norovirus and Crypto-
sporidium, respectively.
The annual probability of infection (Pinf,ann,p,g) (no unit) 
for each pathogen (p) was calculated for each risk reduction 
alternative (g = A0,…A4) as (WHO 2016):
where si (days) represents the duration of the scenario (Si) 
with the specific daily probability of infection (Pinf,p,g,Si). 
Note that the durations (s1 + s2 + … + si) should total 
365 days. The annual probability of infection was thus cal-
culated using a separate Pinf value for each day of the year.
(7)
Pinf,ann,p,g = 1 −
s1∏
1
(
1 − Pinf,p,g,S1
)
⋅
s2∏
1
(
1 − Pinf,p,g,S2
)
…
⋅
si∏
1
(
1 − Pinf,p,g,Si
)
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Scenario‑Based Approach for Including Unexpected 
Risk Events
The base load risk level (UR0) included pathogen load from 
OWTSs, WWTPs, one annual CSO, grazing animals and 
manure application.  UR1,  UR2…URn represented unex-
pected risk events (here n = 3). The unexpected risk events 
are part of the total risk in a drinking water system, as illus-
trated in the risk graph in Fig. 1.
UR1 included UR0 loads and added a rainfall event with 
a 10-year return period, resulting in additional CSO load 
and additional load from grazing and manure application. 
For UR1, the magnitude of a 10-year rainfall event during a 
24 h timeframe (47.3 mm) was calculated using precipitation 
data for the period 2007–2018 based on the Log-Pearson 
III distribution (Ojha et al. 2008). The precipitation gauge 
available in the area has only been in operation since 2007. 
Proximity to the catchment was considered more important, 
hence the relatively short data series for the estimation of 
the 10-year rainfall event. In the SWAT model, fictive pre-
cipitation data series in the form of a 10-year rainfall event 
occurring on the 15th of each month was created. To obtain 
the maximum pathogen concentrations resulting from a 
10-year rainfall event, the maximum concentration based 
on the modelling results using these fictive data for the 15th 
of all months with grazing was used, representing the patho-
gen concentrations in the tributaries during this unexpected 
risk event.
UR2 included  UR0 loads and an emergency CSO (ECSO) 
event, resulting in a high temporary load into the lake. For 
 UR2, the volume (2,370,000 L) of wastewater discharged 
by the ECSO was based on an actual event in the catch-
ment, when a technical failure in the sewer network caused 
untreated wastewater to be discharged. In this simulation 
the total wastewater volume was assumed to be discharged 
on one single day.
UR3 included  UR0 loads and added pathogen load from 
a manure transport accident. For  UR3, the manure trans-
port was assumed to occur in close proximity to one of the 
tributaries, facilitating rapid transport of the manure to Lake 
Vomb. It was assumed that 25,000 L of manure leaked into 
the mouth of one of the tributaries. It was assumed that the 
leak could just as well have occured in any of the tributar-
ies. Only Cryptosporidium was assumed to be present in the 
manure. The Cryptosporidium concentration in manure was 
estimated to be the same as for the hydrological modelling, 
4400 (oocysts/g).
UR1,  UR2 and  UR3 were assumed to have a duration of 
one day and the probability of occurrence (Pocc,URi) was 0.1, 
0.05 and 0.01 for  UR1,  UR2 and  UR3, respectively. The prob-
abilities were based on return period  (UR1), expert judge-
ment  (UR2) and road accident statistics, in combination with 
expert judgement by the authors  (UR3).
Five different types of base load levels were identified, 
representing preconditions where unexpected risk events 
could occur. Examples of these scenarios are schematically 
illustrated in Fig. 3. The solid areas represent the base load 
of activities occurring on a regular basis, and the striped 
areas represent possible positions of the unexpected risk 
events  (UR1–UR3) during the different scenarios.
Provided the unexpected risk event is happening, the 
probability of occurrence during the different scenarios 
was calculated by dividing the possible days of the specific 
scenario each year by the number of days per year (Table 2).
The probability of occurrence was equal for all days 
(365 days) for  UR2 and  UR3, but  UR1 could only occur dur-
ing the grazing period (152 possible days). It was assumed 
that each unexpected risk event could occur only once each 
year, and that different unexpected risk events did not occur 
simultaneously.  UR1 was assumed to occur during the graz-
ing period, either in combination with manure application 
or not (Scenarios G or G + M in Fig. 3). It was assumed that 
the additional CSO load from a 10-year rainfall event was 
added as an event separate from the annual CSO event, and 
the possibility of a simultaneous occurrence of an annual 
CSO and a 10-year rainfall event was thus excluded. Due to 
practices that avoid manure application in conjunction with 
heavy rain, this simultaneous occurrence was also excluded. 
It was assumed that  UR2 and  UR3 could occur during any 
type of scenario (Fig. 3).
To determine the position of the unexpected risk event, a 
discrete distribution with the probability weights reported in 
Table 2 was used in the Monte Carlo simulations. When the 
position was determined, the additional pathogen concentra-
tion was added to the tributary concentrations (Eq. 3) for the 
duration (one day) of the unexpected risk event.
To calculate the increased annual risk (ΔP,Inf,ann,p,g,URi), 
the addition to the total risk level due to the unexpected risk 
event (i) was calculated as:
Table 2  Probability of unexpected risk events occuring during the 
different scenarios in Fig. 3
a UR1 = included  UR0 loads and an added rainfall event with a 10-year 
return period resulting in additional CSO load and additional load 
from grazing and manure application.  UR2 = UR0 loads and an emer-
gency CSO (ECSO) event resulting in a high temporary load into 
the lake.  UR3 = included  UR0 loads and added pathogen load from a 
manure transport accident
NA not applicable
Scenario UR1a UR2a UR3a
O + W NA 198/365 198/365
M NA 14/365 14/365
G 138/152 138/365 138/365
G + M 14/152 14/365 14/365
G + CSO NA 1/365 1/365
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where PInf,ann,p,g,URi was the annual probability of infection in 
the case of a risk event  URi and PInf,ann,p,g,UR0 was the prob-
ability of infection without any unexpected risk event (UR0).
The total annual risk (PInf,ann,p,g,Tot) compriced the base 
load  (UR0) and the unexpected risk events  (UR1–UR3) in 
combination with their respective probability of occurrence, 
and was calculated as:
where Pocc,URi was the annual probability of occurrence of 
unexpected risk events (0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 for  UR1,  UR2 and 
 UR3, respectively).
The change in annual probability of infection for each 
risk reduction alternative compared to the reference alter-
native and the resulting change in QALYs was calculated 
conservatively, assuming that each infection resulted in ill-
ness and using a unit value for the amount of QALYs that 
corresponded to one infection for each pathogen type, as per-
formed in Bergion et al. (2018b). A Campylobacter, norovi-
rus and Cryptosporidium infection corresponds to 0.0163, 
0.0009 and 0.0035 QALYs, respectively (Batz et al. 2014).
Cost–Benefit Analysis
The total annual (ann) benefits (BT) from each risk reduction 
alternative (g) were calculated as:
where BH was the health benefits, BE was the environmental 
benefits, and BO was other additional benefits. The other 
benefits were not included as a monetised benefit, but they 
were identified qualitatively.
The monetisation of the health (H) benefits was estimated 
using a unit value per gained QALY in each risk reduction 
alternative (g) each year (ann), calculated as:
where BH,ann,g was the annual monetised health ben-
efits (SEK), ΔQALYg was the annual change in QALYs, 
the  DWPann (persons) was the drinking water consumer 
population during that year, and  QALYV (SEK/QALY) 
was the unit value of one gained QALY. There were 
400,000 drinking water consumers in both drinking water 
systems. Based on a national prognosis of a 30% popula-
tion increase from 2017 to 2060 (Statistics Sweden 2017), 
an annual population increase was included in the model. 
 QALYV was set at SEK 1,220,000 (Svensson et al. 2015).
(8)ΔPinf,ann,p,g,URi = Pinf,ann,p,g,URi − Pinf,ann,p,g,UR0
(9)
Pinf,ann,p,g,Tot = Pinf,ann,p,g,UR0 +
3∑
i=1
ΔPinf,ann,p,g,URi ⋅ Pocc,URi
(10)BT ,ann,g = BH,ann,g + BE,ann,g + BO,ann,g
(11)BH,ann,g = ΔQALYg ⋅ DWPann ⋅ QALYV
The annual environmental benefits (BE) for reducing the 
nutrient load from wastewater were calculated using a unit 
value per reduced kg of SEK 53 and SEK 25 for phospho-
rous and nitrogen, respectively (SEPA 2008), as performed 
in Bergion et al. (2018b). For g = A1, the annual removal 
of phosphorous (0.9 kg) and nitrogen (5.3 kg) was calcu-
lated as:
where  NuR,ann,g was the annual nutrient (nitrogen or phos-
phorous) removal,  CNu,WW was the maximum measured 
nutrient concentration in CSO events during the period 
2013–2017,  CSOann,A1 was the volume of untreated waste-
water discharged during a CSO, and  ECSOann,A1 was the 
volume of untreated wastewater discharged during an ECSO. 
For g = A3, the reduction in the phosphorous (651 kg) and 
nitrogen (4004 kg) load into the lake was calculated based 
on values from Bergion et al. (2018b).
Investment costs were assumed to arise in the first year 
of the time horizon, and operation and maintenance costs 
were set as an annual cost for the entire time horizon. Costs 
for A1 were based on reported costs from the municipality 
of Sjöbo (personal communication), and the costs for A2 
and A3 were based on Bergion et al. (2018b). In the Vomb 
DWS, investment costs were estimated at approximately 
SEK 1.3 million, SEK 55.5 million, and SEK 36.2 million 
for A1, A2 and A3, respectively. The investment costs for A4 
were the sum of A1, A2 and A3. The annual operation and 
maintenance costs in the Vomb DWS were assumed to be 
approximately SEK 0, SEK 0.43 million and SEK 0.2 mil-
lion for A1, A2 and A3, respectively. The annual operation 
and maintenance costs for A4 were the sum of A1, A2 and 
A3. In the Alt. DWS, the investment costs and operation and 
maintenance costs were the same as for the Vomb DWS with 
the exception of A3. For A3 for the Alt. DWS, the invest-
ment costs were set at SEK 0.36 million, and the annual 
operation and maintenance costs were set at SEK 2,000. 
This was 1% of the costs for A3 in the Vomb DWS, since 
the number of OWTS in the base load was reduced by 99%.
The net present value (NPV) was calculated as:
where B was the benefits for each year; C was the costs for 
each year; r was the discount rate (3.5%); and t was each 
specific year during the time horizon T of 50 years.
The health risk reduction potential was also investi-
gated. The maximum health benefits would be achieved 
if all health risks were reduced to zero. The health benefit 
potential (Bpot.) of each risk reduction alternative was thus 
calculated as:
(12)NuR,ann,g = cNu,WW ⋅ (CSOann,A1 + ECSOann,A1)
(13)NPV =
T∑
t=0
(
Bt
)
(1 + r)t
−
T∑
t=0
(
Ct
)
(1 + r)t
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where BH,Max,g was the monetary health benefits if all micro-
bial risks were removed.
To account for increased risk in the future, a risk increase 
factor was used for future risk levels. A 25% increase com-
pared to 2017 was assumed for 2100. This was equivalent to 
an annual increase of 0.296%. The factor was based on the 
Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute prog-
nosis of increased future precipitation events (SMHI 2015).
To investigate the impact of including unexpected risk 
events, the probability of occurrence was set at 0 for  UR1, 
 UR2 and  UR3 to see the effect on the NPV. This was a deci-
sion model that did not include unexpected risk events.
Sensitivity Analysis
The impact of parameters on the pathogen dose for the five 
scenarios (O + W, G + CSO, M, G and G + M) was inves-
tigated using Spearman rank correlation coefficients. The 
(14)BPot. =
BH,g
BH,Max,g
impact of the dose–response model was studied using scatter 
plots between the two inputs—pathogen dose and infectivity 
versus the probability of infection. Variation in the NPV was 
reported using the coefficient of variation.
The impact of the discount rate and the choice of health 
valuation method on the outcome of the risk-based decision 
model was studied using a manual approach. Two discount 
rates were tested: 3.5% and 1%. The discount rate of 3.5% 
was based on the discount rate used by the road administra-
tion authorities in Sweden when evaluating large infrastruc-
ture projects. The discount rate of 1% was chosen, since the 
long-term investments that are evaluated in the case study 
spanned several future generations and this may justify a 
lower discount rate.
To investigate the sensitivity of the NPV to the health val-
uation method used, apart from using the value of a QALY, 
the cost of illness and added cost of disutility, COI(+), was 
used as a health valuation method in addition to using the 
value of a QALY (Bergion et al. 2018a). The annual health 
benefits (BH,ann,g) (Eq. 10) were then calculated as:
Fig. 4  The simulated 50th percentile (median) of the pathogen con-
centrations (Campylobacter, norovirus and Cryptosporidium) in the 
raw water intake and in the drinking water caused by the base load 
for the Vomb drinking water system (Vomb DWS) and for the Alter-
native drinking water system (Alt. DWS). O + W, G + CSO, M, G 
and G + M represent the five scenarios as shown in Fig. 3. The risk 
reduction alternatives were as follows: (A0) the reference alternative 
where no risk reduction measures were implemented; (A1) instal-
lation of pumps and a back-up power supply to remove CSOs and 
ECSOs; (A2) installation of UV treatment in the drinking water treat-
ment plant (DWTP); (A3) connection of 25% of the OWTSs in the 
catchment to the WWTP; and (A4) a combination of A1–A3. Whisk-
ers represent the 95th percentiles. Note that the risk contribution from 
unexpected risk events is excluded from the results in this figure
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where ΔPinf,ann,p,g was the change in annual probability of 
infection per person resulting from each risk reduction alter-
native A1–A4 (g),  DWPann (persons) was the drinking water 
(15)
BH,ann,g =
∑
p=Campy,noro,Crypto
ΔPInf,ann,p,g ⋅ DWPann ⋅ COI(+)V ,p
consumer population during year y, and COI(+)V,p (SEK/
infection) was the unit value of one avoided infection for 
each respective pathogen. COI(+)V,p was set at SEK 30,537, 
SEK 6064 and SEK 26,273 for Campylobacter, norovirus 
and Cryptosporidium, respectively (Bergion et al. 2018a).
Fig. 5  Risk level in terms of 
annual probability of infec-
tion (Annual Pinf) and number 
of annual infections (Annual 
infections) for drinking 
water consumers for the risk 
reduction alternatives: (A0) 
reference alternative where no 
risk reduction measures were 
implemented; (A1) installation 
of pumps and a back-up power 
supply to remove CSOs and 
ECSOs; (A2) installation of 
UV treatment in the drinking 
water treatment plant (DWTP); 
(A3) connection of 25% of the 
OWTSs in the catchment to the 
WWTP; and (A4) a combina-
tion of A1–A3. Reduction in the 
annual probability of infection 
(ΔAnnual Pinf), reduction in the 
number of infections (ΔAnnual 
Infections), and reduction in 
QALYs (ΔAnnual QALYs) for 
the risk reduction alternatives 
A1–A4 are presented in com-
parison to A0. Bars represents 
the 50th percentile (median) and 
whiskers represent the 95th per-
centiles. Note that unexpected 
risk events are included in the 
results reported in this figure
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Results
The results of the QMRA and the CBA are presented below. 
The manual sensitivity analysis of the impact of the discount 
rate and the health valuation method are included as part of 
the results below. The sensitivity analysis using Spearman 
rank correlation coefficients, scatter plots and coefficient of 
variation is reported in Supplementary Material (Tables S4, 
S5, S7 and Fig. S1).
Quantitative Microbial Risk Assessment
The simulated base load pathogen concentrations in the raw 
water intake and in drinking water for Campylobacter, noro-
virus and Cryptosporidium are presented in Fig. 4.
The annual probability of infection and annual number of 
infections, using the scenario-based approach for including 
unexpected risk events, are presented in Fig. 5, as are the 
reduction in the annual probability of infection, the reduc-
tion in the number of infections and the reduction in QALYs 
in comparison to the reference alternative (A0).
Both in US and the Netherlands (Signor and Ashbolt 
2009) an annual probability of infection of  10–4 has been 
used as a guideline for an acceptable risk of exposure to 
pathogens via drinking water. In Sweden, there is no speci-
fied acceptable risk level. Consequently,  10–4 is used in this 
study for comparison purposes. Looking at the 50th and 95th 
percentiles, the Vomb DWS had a microbial risk level below 
 10–4 for all pathogens for all the alternatives, i.e. A0-A4. For 
the Alt. DWS, looking at the included percentiles the micro-
bial level in A0 was above  10–4 for norovirus, but below  10–4 
for Campylobacter and Cryptosporidium. For the Alt. DWS, 
risk reduction alternatives A1 and A3 reduced the norovirus 
risk level, but not below the acceptable risk level, while A2 
and A4 reduced the norovirus risk to below  10–4.
For the Vomb DWS, the unexpected risk events 
 (UR1–UR3) contributed 1.5%, < 0.1%, 1.5%, 1.6% 
and < 0.1% of the total risk for A0, A1, A2, A3 and A4, 
respectively, (looking at the 50th percentile). For the Alt. 
DWS, the unexpected risk events contributed 60.1%, < 0.1%, 
60.2%, 62.0% and 0.4% of the total risk for A0, A1, A2, A3 
and A4, respectively.
For the Vomb DWS, looking at the 50th percentile, 
the annual number of infections was < 1 for all pathogens 
and all risk reduction alternatives (A0–A4). For the Alt. 
DWS, looking at the 50th percentile, the annual number 
of infections (Campylobacter/norovirus/Cryptosporidium) 
was (7.4E0/3.0E2/1.7E−2), (7.4E0/2.1E2/1.7E−2), 
(3.7E−5/1.7E−2/1.7E−5), (5.5E0/2.6E2/1.6E−2) and 
(2.8E−5/1.0E−2/1.6E−5) for A0, A1, A2, A3 and A4, 
respectively.
For the Vomb DWS, the contribution of different path-
ogens, Campylobacter/norovirus/Cryptosporidium, to 
the total annual number of infections (mean) was < 0.1% 
/ > 99.9% / < 0.1% for all the alternatives (A0–A4). For 
the Alt. DWS, the contribution of different pathogens 
Campylobacter/norovirus/Cryptosporidium to the total 
annual infections was 0.1%/99.9%/< 0.1% for A0 and A3, 
0.2%/99.8%/< 0.1% for A1, < 0.1%/99.7%/0.3% for A2, 
and < 0.1%/99.3%/0.7% for A4.
The annual lost QALYs for each risk reduction alterna-
tive and the reduction in annual lost QALYs are presented 
in Table 3. The reduction in annual lost QALYs in com-
parison to the reference alternative (A0) represents the 
avoided QALYs and thus the health risk reduction.
Cost–Benefit Analysis
Net Present Value
The NPVs for A1, A2, A3 and A4 are presented in Fig. 6. 
The exact figures for the NPV percentiles are reported in 
the Supplementary Material, Table S6.
Table 3  Annual lost QALYs for 
each risk reduction alternative, 
and the corresponding reduction 
in lost QALYs in comparison 
to A0
a The risk reduction alternatives were as follows: (A0), no risk reduction measures were implemented; (A1) 
installation of pumps and a back-up power supply to remove CSOs and ECSOs; (A2) installation of UV 
treatment in the drinking water treatment plant (DWTP); (A3) connection of 25% of the OWTSs in the 
catchment area to the WWTP; and (A4) a combination of A1–A3
Risk reduction 
 alta
Vomb DWS Alt. DWS
Annual lost QALYs ∆Annual QALYs 
(%)
Annual lost QALYs ∆Annual 
QALYs 
(%)
A0 4.35E−4 – 2.53 –
A1 4.28E−4 1.49% 1.01 60.1%
A2 2.49E−8 > 99.9% 1.46E−4 > 99.9%
A3 4.02E−4 7.60% 2.45 3.12%
A4 2.28E−8 > 99.9% 5.38E−5 > 99.9%
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The NPVs for the Vomb DWS were negative for all 
risk reduction alternatives (< 0.001 probability of a posi-
tive NPV). This was consistent when the discount rate 
was altered and when the health valuation method was 
altered. Ranking the 50th percentile of the NPVs for the 
different risk reduction alternatives resulted in the rank 
order A1 > A3 > A2 > A4. This rank order did not change 
when using the lower discount rate (1%) or when using 
the health valuation method COI+.
For the Alt. DWS, the rank order of the risk reduction 
alternatives based on the NPVs is presented in Table 4 for 
the 5th, 50th and 95th percentiles.
Probability of Having the Highest Net Present Value 
and Probability of a Positive Net Present Value
For the Vomb DWS, the probability of having the highest 
NPV was > 0.999 for A1 and < 0.001 for A2–A4. For the 
Alt. DWS, the probability of having the highest NPV and 
the probability of a positive NPV are presented in Table 5.
For the Alt. DWS using the health valuation method 
SVoQ, A2 and A4 achieved > 99.9% of the maximum pos-
sible health benefits (100% would correspond to all risks 
being reduced to 0), while A1 and A3 achieved < 0.1–37% 
and 16–17% of the maximum possible health benefits, 
respectively (ranges from 5 to 95th percentiles). Looking 
Fig. 6  Net present values for 
the risk reduction alternatives: 
(A1) installation of pumps 
and a back-up power supply to 
remove CSOs and ECSOs; (A2) 
installation of UV treatment in 
the drinking water treatment 
plant (DWTP); (A3) connec-
tion of 25% of the OWTSs in 
the catchment to the WWTP; 
and (A4) a combination of 
A1–A3. Sensitivity analyses 
of the discount rates (DR) and 
the choice of health valuation 
method (societal value of a 
QALY (SVoQ)) and the cost of 
illness adding cost of disutility, 
(COI+) are presented. P05, P50 
and P95 are the 5th, 50th and 
95th percentiles, respectively
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at the health valuation method COI+, A2 and A4 still 
achieved > 99.9% of the maximum possible health benefits, 
while A1 and A3 achieved < 0.1–49% and 13–15% of the 
maximum possible health benefits, respectively (ranges from 
5 to 95th percentiles).
Benefits not included in the NPV were identified and are 
reported in Table 6. The list does not claim to be complete, 
although it does include important non-monetised benefits.
Discussion
Previous economic evaluation of microbial risk has focused 
mainly on the effects (Assmuth et al. 2016; Juntunen et al. 
2017) and not compared different risk reduction alternatives. 
The enhanced risk-based decision model presented here 
included a detailed analysis of microbial risk reduction alter-
natives and used CBA for economic evaluation, making it 
possible to evaluate and compare the alternatives using their 
societal profitability. The presented decision model enables 
Table 4  Rank number of the 
risk reduction alternatives based 
on the NPVs for the Alt. DWS
The alternative with the highest rank number is marked in bold
a The risk reduction alternatives were as follows: (A1) installation of pumps and a back-up power sup-
ply to remove CSOs and ECSOs; (A2) installation of UV treatment in the drinking water treatment plant 
(DWTP); (A3) connection of 25% of the OWTSs in the catchment to the WWTP; and (A4) a combination 
of A1-A3
b COI+ cost of illness and adding disutility, and SVoQ societal value of a quality-adjusted life year, as pre-
sented in Bergion et al. (2018a)
Valuation 
 methodb
Discount 
rate (%)
Alt. DWS—Rank number of the risk reduction  alternativea NPVs
5th percentile 50th percentile 95th percentile
A1 A2 A3 A4 A1 A2 A3 A4 A1 A2 A3 A4
SVoQ 3.5 2 3 1 4 2 3 1 4 1 3 2 4
1 2 3 1 4 2 3 1 4 1 3 2 4
COI+ 3.5 2 3 1 4 1 3 2 4 1 4 2 3
1 2 3 1 4 3 1 4 2 3 1 4 2
Table 5  Probability of having the highest net present value (NPV) and probability of a positive NPV for the Alt. DWS
The risk reduction alternatives with the probability of having the highest NPV and highest probability of a positive NPV are marked bold
a COI + cost of illness and adding disutility, and SVoQ societal value of a quality-adjusted life year, as presented in Bergion et al. (2018a)
b The risk reduction alternatives were as follows: (A1) installation of pumps and a back-up power supply to remove CSOs and ECSOs; (A2) 
installation of UV treatment in the drinking water treatment plant (DWTP); (A3) connection of 25% of the OWTSs in the catchment to the 
WWTP; and (A4) a combination of A1-A3
Valuation 
 methoda
Discount rate 
(%)
Alt. DWS—Unexpected risk events included
Probability of having the highest NPV Probability of a positive NPV
A1b A2 A3 A4 A1 A2 A3 A4
SVoQ 3.5 0.37 < 0.01 0.63 < 0.01 0.54 0.01 > 0.99 0.01
1 0.40 0.01 0.59 < 0.01 0.59 0.03 > 0.99 0.03
COI+ 3.5 0.42 0.12 0.46 < 0.01 0.64 0.47 > 0.99 0.45
1 0.20 0.52 0.29 < 0.01 0.65 0.83 > 0.99 0.82
Valuation 
 methoda
Discount rate 
(%)
Alt. DWS—unexpected risk events excluded
Probability of having the highest NPV Probability of a positive NPV
A1 A2 A3 A4 A1 A2 A3 A4
SVoQ 3.5 < 0.01 0.01 0.99 < 0.01 < 0.01 0.01 > 0.99 0.01
1 < 0.01 0.02 0.98 < 0.01 < 0.01 0.02 > 0.99 0.02
CO+ 3.5 < 0.01 0.07 0.93 < 0.01 < 0.01 0.14 > 0.99 0.13
1 < 0.01 0.33 0.67 < 0.01 < 0.01 0.62 > 0.99 0.59
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an evaluation to be made using an economic perspective, as 
outlined by the World Health Organization (2001).
Although a strict CBA approach considers only the 
NPVs, there may be other criteria (legislation, pursuing an 
opportunity, etc.) that need to be taken into account when 
determining whether the risk needs to be reduced (WHO 
2017). It may be the case that an alternative that reduces the 
risk to an acceptable risk level needs to be implemented, 
even though this alternative results in a negative NPV. Given 
that each risk reduction alternative fulfils the non-monetary 
criteria, the alternative with the highest NPV rank order 
should be implemented. This approach combines the two 
decision criteria of maximising societal benefits and fulfill-
ing legal requirements.
For the Vomb DWS, the probability of a positive NPV 
was very low for all alternatives. This is mainly because of 
the high  log10 removal in the DWTP and a low probability 
of infection for the reference alternative. Hence, the risk 
reduction alternatives could not substantially reduce the risk 
any further. For the Alt. DWS,  log10 removal in the DWTP 
was lower, and a temporary increase in pathogen load in 
the raw water thus had a greater effect on the dose to which 
the drinking water consumers were exposed. This, and the 
fact that the Alt. DWS had the highest risk compared to 
the Vomb DWS, resulted in a greater health risk reduction 
due to the risk reduction alternatives and thus also a higher 
probability of a positive NPV. However, this large health risk 
reduction also affects the uncertainties in the NPV. The high 
 log10 removal in the Vomb DWS reduced the dose to a low 
and similar level in most cases in such a way that, based on 
the dose–response relationship the effect of additional risk 
reduction alternatives was almost negligible. For the Alt. 
DWS, the lower  log10 removal resulted in a higher effect 
from risk reduction alternatives in terms of more avoided 
infections and thus a greater variation. This suppressing 
effect of the high  log10 removal, in this case the artificial 
groundwater recharge, can be seen in the uncertainty in 
the NPV values when comparing the two DWS, resulting 
in a higher coefficient of variation in the NPV for the Alt. 
DWS compared to the Vomb DWS (Supplementary Mate-
rial, Table S7). However, a high degree of uncertainty in the 
NPV does not automatically mean there is high uncertainty 
regarding the risk reduction alternative that is the most prof-
itable for society.
The results for the Vomb DWS show that the unexpected 
risk events did not constitute a high proportion of the total 
risk. However, for the Alt. DWS, the unexpected risk events 
were the main contributor to the total risk for both norovi-
rus and Cryptosporidium, but not for Campylobacter. The 
importance of unexpected risk events for the outcome of risk 
reduction measures is dependent on the conditions in the 
drinking water system. It is important to acknowledge that 
sub-optimal treatment in the DWTP, especially in combina-
tion with other unexpected risk events, may result in high 
microbial risks to the drinking water consumers (Taghipour 
et al. 2019). It is thus important to also identify and included 
unexpected events within the drinking water treatment plant. 
Where there is a low pathogen base load, as the case for A3 
in the Alt. DWS, the contribution of unexpected risk events 
to the total risk is greater than in situations where the base 
load is higher. In the Alt. DWS, where there is a lower base 
load and lower pathogen removal in the DWTP, the unex-
pected risk events have a greater impact than in the Vomb 
DWS. When the unexpected risks were excluded, the order 
of probability of the risk reduction alternatives having the 
highest NPV changed, and the probability of a positive NPV 
also changed. In Westrell et al. (2003), where a DWTP with 
high  log10 removal was evaluated, the base load was reported 
as being the cause of the majority of waterborne illnesses. In 
this study we confirm these results and add to the discussion 
that the importance of unexpected risk events is higher in the 
DWS, where  log10 removal in the DWTP is lower.
The stakeholder distribution of costs and benefits for the 
risk reduction alternatives has not been explored in detail in 
this study. It has been shown earlier (Bergion et al. 2018b) 
that including a UV treatment step (A2) distributed all the 
benefits and costs to the drinking water consumers (assum-
ing the UV treatment is paid for using the drinking water 
Table 6  Benefits not included in 
the net present value (NPV)
a Based on Bergion et al. (2018b)
Additional benefits not included in the NPV A1 A2a A3a A4
Reduced risk of infection for animals (wild and domestic) in the catchment X X X
Reduced risk of infections for recreational swimmers in the catchment X X X
Owners of OWTS relieved of responsibility for treating wastewater X X
Increased market value of properties connected to the WWTP X X
Reduced  CO2 emissions due to less transport of sludge from OWTS X X
Increased opportunities for nutrient recycling X X X
Reduced traffic accidents involving heavy traffic X X
Reduced chlorination by-products due to reduced chlorination dose X X
Reduced handling and storage of chlorination chemicals X X
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charge). As regards connection of the OWTSs (A3) a dis-
crepancy between the persons bearing the costs and the 
persons receiving the benefits was identified (Bergion et al. 
2018b), where most of the costs were borne by the private 
owners of the OWTSs and at the same time most of the 
health benefits were attributed to drinking water consumers 
supplied with drinking water from Lake Vomb. Distribution 
of costs is generally not fixed and is arranged according to 
the settings for the drinking water system, the risk reduction 
alternative and the specific stakeholders in question.
Even though the presented decision model enables the 
important inclusion of additional events and conditions 
typically not considered, further development is possible. 
For example, the exclusion of the possibility of a 10-year 
rainfall occurring outside the grazing period could result 
in an underestimation of the risk. It was based on the fact 
that most (75%) of heavy precipitation events (2 h intensity) 
occurs in June, July and August (Hernebring 2006). It is also 
possible that the risk is underestimated since we assumed 
that unexpected risk events do not occur simultaneously.
A more accurate description of the inter annual fluctua-
tions of pathogen concentrations in wastewater treatment 
plant effluent (Westrell et al. 2006) could be a way of achiev-
ing a more comprehensive microbial risk assessment.
The 25% risk increase through to 2100 was based on 
predictions from SMHI for future risk events connected to 
precipitation. For the purposes of this study, it was assumed 
that this increase was applicable to all types of risks. How-
ever, future work should include additional investigations 
into how to analyse future changes in risk levels for non-cli-
mate-related risk events. Furthermore, ways in which exist-
ing models (e.g. Schijven et al. 2013) describing microbial 
risks in relation to climate change can be included in the 
decision model should also be investigated.
Hydrological modelling was included to better describe 
pathogen contribution from grazing animals and the appli-
cation of manure. In this study, the conversion from deter-
ministic to stochastic results was done using a resampling 
function. This enables results from all the years in the sim-
ulated period to be used as input for the decision model. 
Future improvements could include investigating other 
methods for incorporating stochastic hydrological model-
ling results. The hydrological model was only calibrated 
and validated for the water flow. For future applications, 
the water quality component of the model should also be 
calibrated and validated. For this study, lack of observed 
pathogen data was the reason for not pursuing these 
measures. However, during the initial setup of the model 
(Bergion et al. 2018b) it was confirmed that the norovirus 
infections spread through drinking water only accounted 
for a small part of the reported infections in the popu-
lation. This would be expected and thus provide initial 
validation of the model. The groundwater modelling was 
based on a simplified approach using stochastic simulation 
of an analytical transport and fate model. For future appli-
cations, the use of more sophisticated stochastic numerical 
models should be investigated to take into account aquifer 
heterogeneities.
Conclusion
Based on the results from the risk-based decision model, 
it can be concluded that the effect and importance of con-
sidering unexpected events is determined by the local pre-
conditions. In drinking water systems with a low patho-
gen base load and low pathogen removal potential in the 
drinking water treatment plant, the unexpected risk events 
have a greater impact compared to drinking water sys-
tems with a high pathogen base load and high pathogen 
removal potential in the drinking water treatment plant. 
Hence, the risk reduction alternatives aimed at reducing 
the unexpected risk events will have the greatest effect in 
the former system rather than the latter.
The results show that unexpected risk events can affect 
the results of a decision analysis and change the alterna-
tive that is most profitable. In the Alt. DWS, excluding 
the unexpected risks from the decision model resulted in 
changes in the probability of having the highest net present 
value and changes in the probability of a positive net pre-
sent value of the risk reduction alternatives. In addition, 
the rank order of the NPV of the risk reduction alternatives 
changed, resulting in a different prioritisation.
In summary, this work has resulted in a comprehensive 
decision support model, capable of including contributions 
from both base load and unexpected risk events to the 
total microbial health risk in drinking water systems. The 
model can be used in real world systems, and the appli-
cations in this study show that a comprehensive model, 
which includes both base load and unexpected risk events, 
is needed to provide proper decision support with regard 
to microbial safety measures.
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